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It has long been difficult to discern clearly the 
jurisdictional boundaries for the exercises of a 
Texas peace officer's warrantless arrest authority. 
This is due in part to the variety of "peace offi-
cers" recognized in Texas law, and in part to the 
numerous imprecise statutes which govern the 
issue. It is also due largely to the difficulty in 
defining what "jurisdiction" means in this context. 
For courts, "jurisdiction" refers to the power or 
authority to act respecting either the persons 
before the court or the nature of the matter to be 
adjudicated. Similarly, arrest "jurisdiction" may 
mean the authority to arrest for certain kinds of 
offenses, or it may refer to the power to make an 
arrest in a certain territorial area. It is territorial 
"jurisdiction," not jurisdiction to arrest for 
differing types of offenses, that is most difficult to 
confidently resolve in Texas. Resolution begins 
with consideration of the person who will make 
the arrest. 
Who is a "peace officer?" 
Article 2.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal 
Procedure purports to defme those persons who 
are "peace officers." However, the statute is not 
exclusive; other persons are designated peace 
officers by various provisions of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure and Texas Revised Civil 
Statute. The determination of whether an 
arresting officer is a "peace officer," and, if so, 
what kind of officer, is especially important in 
determining that officer's territorial arrest 
jurisdiction. 
Because the employment status of a peace 
officer ultimately decides the geographical 
boundaries within which he may exercise his arrest 
power, no single rule of territorial jurisdiction 
applies to all peace officers. This article focuses 
only on municipal police officers because such 
officers are the most numerous kind of peace 
officer, and because recent statutory amendments 
and case law have greatly changed traditional 
views of the territorial arrest jurisdiction of city 
police. 
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Warrantless arrests in Texas 
A cursory reading of the principal statutes 
authorizing warrantless arrests in Texas seems to 
resolve the question ofterritorial jurisdiction. For 
example, Article 14.01(b) of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure says that, "(a) peace officer may arrest 
an offender without a warrant for any offense 
committed in his presence or within his view." 
Similar expressions are found in other statutes 
authorizing warrantless arrest.1 This statutory 
language might be thought to confer on all "peace 
officers" the right to arrest without warrant 
anywhere within the state. While this view 
seemed to prevail at one time/ the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals has more recently rejected this 
interpretation, holding in Christopher v. State3 
that the statutory warrant exceptions do not 
create the authority to arrest in any particular 
place, but only to arrest without a warrant if 
otherwise authorized to do so.4 
At common law city officers were 
limited to arrest within their '?Jai/i-
wick" or city limits. The only excep-
tion to this limitation was for "hot 
pursuit. .. " 
Territorial arrest authority is created for city 
police officers by statute or, if no statute controls, 
by common law. At common law city officers 
were limited to arrest within their "bailiwick" or 
city limits.5 The only exception to this limitation 
was for "hot pursuit" begun within the city 
boundaries resulting in an arrest outside the 
officer's jurisdiction.6 The "hot pursuit" exception 
remains intact; the common law rule limiting 
arrests to the municipality does not.7 
The common law rule has been abrogated by 
the interpretation of Articles 998 and 999 of the 
Texas Revised Civil Statues as legislatively 
defming the territorial arrest jurisdiction of city 
police officers. In Angel v. State,8 the Court of 
Criminal Appeals held that since Article 998 gave 
municipal police the same territorial "jurisdiction" 
as city marshals,9 and since Article 999 granted 
city marshals the same "jurisdiction" as the 
sheriff, 10 city police, like the sheriff, could arrest 
without warrant anywhere within the county in 
which the city is located.U 
The reasoning in Angel is certainly subject to 
dispute. It depends, for example, on the reading 
of "jurisdiction" in Articles 998 and 999 as 
referring to territorial jurisdiction rather than 
likening the powers and authority of the city 
officer to those of the city marshal and sheriff. 
Moreover, the decision in Angel completely 
overlooks the existence of Article 999b, a statute 
which provided an expansion of the authority of a 
city officer to areas outside his municipality when 
an interlocal assistance agreement had been 
executed with neighboring cities.U The implica-
tion of Article 999b is that the warrantless arrest 
authority of city police officers is limited to the 
officer's municipality, an idea consistent with the 
common law rule confining a city officer to his 
"bailiwick."13 
The Code takes a different ap-
proach to classifying municipalities 
and uses somewhat different lan-
guage to describe the duties and au-
thority of municipal police, all of 
which further confuses the jurisdic-
tionquestion. 
The impact of recent legislation 
Regardless of whether the Court was correct in 
Angel, the issue has not been laid to rest. Articles 
998, 999, and 999b were codified in the new Texas 
Local Government code effective September 1, 
1987. The Code takes a different approach to 
classifying municipalities and uses somewhat 
different language to describe the duties and 
authority of municipal police, 14 all of which 
further confuses the jurisdiction question. 
Municipalities are not classified as Type A, 
Type B, or Type C general-law municipalities, 
home-rule municipalities, or special-law munici-
palities.1s While Type A, Type C, and home-rule 
municipalities may have police officers, no 
provision is made for Type B municipalities to 
maintain a police force. 16 Further, the new 
statutes say nothing about the jurisdiction of 
police officers in Type Cor home-rule municipali-
ties, 17 and refer to the powers, rights, and jurisdic-
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tion" of Type A city police officers as being the 
same as a marshal of such a city.18 
With respect to the territorial arrest jurisdiction 
of officers of Type A municipalities, the Court of 
Criminal Appeals might interpret the Code as it 
interpreted Articles 998 and 999 in Angel despite 
differences in the language of the three statues.19 
But if it does so, what is to be made of the fact 
that nothing is said about the territorial jurisdic-
tion of Type C and home-rule municipalities? It 
seems unlikely that the legislature intended to give 
some city police officers county-wide arrest 
jurisdiction while limiting other city police to city-
wide jurisdiction. It may be instead that the 
legislature intended all city police officers to be 
limited to arrest within their municipalities unless 
a statute expressly expands that authority. 
In the same legislatwe that restruc-
tured the treatment of municipalities 
and their police officers, one statute 
was enacted which did expressly 
expand the territorial arrest jurisdic-
tion of police officers_ 
In the same legislature that restructured the 
treatment of municipalities and their police 
officers, one statute was enacted which did 
expressly expand the territorial arrest jurisdiction 
of police officers. Article 14.03( c) also became 
effective on September 1, 1987, and it provides 
that, "A peace officer who is outside his jurisdic-
tion may arrest, without warrant, a person who 
commits an offense within the officer's presence 
or view, if the offense is a felony or a violation of 
Title 9, Chapter 42, Penal Code . . . . "2!J 
To the extent that Article 14.03(c) authorizes a 
city police officer, or any peace officer, to arrest 
state-wide for on-view felonies, the statute merely 
restates what has long been the law in Texas. 
Article 14.01(a) permits "a peace officer or any 
other person" to arrest without warrant when the 
offense is committed in the presence or view of 
the officer, if the offense is a felony or breach of 
the public peace. 21 Like Article 18.16 (preventing 
the consequences of theft), Article 14.01(a) has 
been interpreted to permit any citizen, including 
any peace officer, to arrest for certain offenses.22 
Article 14.03(c) goes beyond prior law in 
authorizing state-wide warrantless arrests for 
misdemeanor violations of Title 9, Chapter 42. It 
is unclear why these crimes were chosen for 
special treatment, but it may be that the legisla-
ture thought them to be the equivalent of offenses 
"against the public peace." 
The bottom line 
The difficulty in determining territorial arrest 
jurisdiction is amply demonstrated by considering 
the effect of current case law and statutes on a 
single kind of peace officer. The arrest jurisdic-
tion of a city police officer employed by a Type A 
general-law municipality, for example, may be 
summarized as follows: 
1. "on-view'' felonies - the officer has state-wide 
jurisdiction based on Articles 14.01(a) and 
14.03(c), C.C.P.; 
2. "on-view'' misdemeanors which breach the 
public peace - officer has state-wide jurisdiction as 
does "any other person" by authority of Article 
14.01(a), C.C.P.; 
3. "on-view'' misdemeanor violations of Title 9, 
Chapter 42 of the Texas Penal Code - state-wide 
jurisdiction provided by Article 14.03(c), C.C.P.; 
4. theft offenses (misdemeanor or felony- need 
not be "on-view'') - the officer, like "all persons," 
may arrest state-wide pursuant to Article 18.16, 
C.C.P.; 
5. all "on-view'' offenses in which "hot pursuit" 
begins within municipal boundaries and capture 
and arrest occurs outside city limits;23 
6. in all other situations, the officer's arrest 
jurisdiction is county-wide.24 
Although it is supported by judicial decisions 
and statues, this summary is no more than a "best 
guess" in some respects. It assumes, for example, 
that for officers of a Type A municipality, the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals would interpret 
Chapter 341 of the Local Government Code in the 
same way it interpreted the prior law in Articles 
998 and 999 of the Revised Civil Code, an assump-
tion that may not be warranted. Nevertheless, the 
summary serves to demonstrate the synthesis of 
various sources of law necessary to determine 
when and where the Texas city police officer may 
arrest. This demonstration is by no means 
complete since it focuses only on officers of Type 
A municipalities, and not on police in Type C or 
home-rule municipalities. Moreover, it does not 
address difficult questions concerning the scope of 
the various statutory exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. 
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.... the ultimate solution lies in the 
adoption of uniform legislation 
expressly addressing territorial 
arrest jurisdiction. ... 
What is clear from this example is that Texas 
law respecting territorial arrest jurisdiction is 
presently unduly, and probably unworkably, 
complex. While appellate courts in Texas may 
adopt interpretations of recently enacted statutes 
which somewhat clarify these limits, the ultimate 
solution lies in the adoption of uniform legislation 
expressly addressing territorial arrest jurisdiction. 
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